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318 PEOPLE V. CRIMM. [19 C. (2d) 
[3] It is next contended that the record fails to disclose 
that the jury was present at all stages of the trial. There 
were numerous recesses during the trial. When the court 
would reconvene the trial judge would inquire if it was stipu-
lated that the jurors were all present and in their places. 
Two or more counsel so stipulated on each occasion. Be-
cause appellant's counsel made an audible stipulation on 
only three occasions, it is argued that "the record is entirely 
silent upon the matter of whether or not the jury ever did 
return after any particular recess." Two or more counsel, 
however, did stipulate to the presence of the entire jury, 
and the entire jury was present at all stages of the proceed-
ings. Nowhere is it charged .that the jury or any part thereof 
was absent at any time .when its presence was required. 
[4] There is neither error nor prejudice in that part of 
the district attorney's closing argument challenged by the 
appellant. The prosecuting officer was free to djscuss the 
conflict in the two stories related by appellant and to ad-
vance any reasonable motive therefor. 
[5] The fact that during a recess of court appellant first 
related to defense counsel other than his own the story that 
he alone had perpetrated the homicide does not require a 
reversal. Before the reconvening of the court his own. cOUn-
sel was likewise so advised. The court upon being informed 
of appellant's change of testimony took every precaution to 
protect him from pursuing an ill-advised course. The court 
admonished the appellant in the following manner: "Now, 
you understand, Mr. Crimm, that you are now testifying in 
the case where you are accused of the crime of murder, and 
if you make any statements, they must be freely and volun-
tarily; if you give any testimony here, it must be freely and 
voluntarily, with the understanding that you are now on 
trial for the murder of the deceased in this case. . And any-
thing that you say, of course, would be considered by this 
Jury in the matter of determining your innocence, as well 
as by the Jury in the event that they find that you are guilty 
of the crime of murder in the first degree; it would also be 
considered by the jury in determining the amount of punish-
ment that you would receive. Now you have your counsel, 
Mr. Artz, who has been appointed by this Court, and you 
have been accorded all of the rights that the law provides 
for a man charged with crime. I would suggest that you 
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be very careful, that you tell the truth, that you be not guided 
by anything except the absolute truth, and aside from that, 
you are not ·required to testify against yourself unless you 
so desire." 
In the face of this advice by the court the appellant pro-
ceeded to relate the story that implicated him as the sole 
perpetrator of the murder. He testified further that he had 
no desire to see innocent persons suffer and that his change 
of story was entirely voluntary and not the result of fear 
or duress. Appellant's counsel cross-examined him with re-
spect to the new story and at no time requested a continuance 
to permit further consultation between client and counsel. 
At all times appellant had· the advice and assistance of coun-
sel and the circumstances surrounding the revised story in 
no way S'lggcsts, as contended, "a denial of due process of 
law." 
An examination of the entire record reveals nothing in i"!'lS 
rulings on the evidence or in the giving or refusing of ill" 
structlons that requires a reversal. 
The juJgment and order are affirmed. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
26, 1942. Houser, J., did not participate therein. 
[So F. No. 16656. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1942.] 
MORRIS GREENBERG, Petitioner, V. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRAN-
CISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence-E:ffect of Absence of 
Evidence.-When a grand jury indicts a person without the 
presentation of evidence to connect him with the commission 
[1] Quashing indictment for lack of evidence, note, 59 A. L. R. 
567. See, also, 27 Am. Jur.719. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Grand Jury, § 28; [2] Prohibi-
tion, § 43. 
/ 
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of the crime charged, it exceeds its authority, and the indict. 
me.nt returned is void and ineffectual to confer jurisdiction 
upon a court to try a person for the offense charged. (See 
Pen. Code, § 921.) 
[2] Prohibition - Criminal Proceedings - Grand Jury-Lack of 
Evidence.-A writ of prohibition will lie to restrain a, trial 
upon an indictment which is void because unsupported by any 
evidence be~ore the grand jury, there being no remedy by ap-
peal from orders denying a motion to quash and overruling a 
demurrer. The common-law rule of nonimpeachabilityof an 
indictment ceased to exist in California with the amendment 
of Pen. Code, § 925, so as to require a transcript of testimony 
in cases in which an indictment is found. (Brobeck v. Supe-
rior Court, 152 Cal. 289, 92 Pac. 646, overruled.) 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court,of the City and County of San Francisco from proceed-
ing with 'a trial. Writ granted. 
James C. Purcell and \Villiam E. Ferriter for Petitioner. 
Matthew Brady, District Attorney, and John R. Golden, 
Assistant District Attorney for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The grand jury of the City and County 
of San Francisco returned an indictment charging petitioner 
and four others with conspiracy to commit grand theft in vio-
lation of Penal Code section 182. The indictment charged 
that all of the persons named therein procured from the Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Company a policy of avtomobile in-
surance on an automobile that had already been wrecked, that 
they then reported to the company that the car was wrecked 
at a time after the date of issuance of the insurance, and that 
the company paid them for the asserted loss. After petitioner 
was arraigned, he moved to quash the indictment on the 
ground that it was void and that the court was without juris-
diction to proceed thereon because there was no evidence be-
fore the grand jury tending to support the charges made 
against him. His motion was denied and he demurred to the 
indictment. The court overruled the demurrer and set the 
case for trial. Petitioner has no appeal from either the order 
of the court refusing to quash the indictment or the overrul-
ing of the demurrer, and has therefore petitioned this court 
Jan. 1942.J GREEN'BE1W v. SUPERtOR COURT. 
[19 C. (2d) 319) 
321 
for a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from pro-
ceeding with the trial. 
The transcript of the testimony upon which the indictment 
was based contains no evidence even remotely supporting the 
charges made against petitioner. Respondent contends, how-
ever, that in California prohibition will not lie to restrain a 
court from proceeding with the trial of a petitioner on the 
ground that there was no evidence presented to the grand 
jury of his guilt of the. offense ch~rged. 
Prohibition will issue to restrain an inferior tribunal from 
acting in excess of its jurisdiction if there is no plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code 
Civ. Proc., sections 1102, 1103.) Public offenses against 
the State of California must, with few exceptions, be prose-
cuted by indictment or information, and a court has no juris-
diction to proceed with the trial of an offense unless a valid 
indictment or information has first been presented. (Cal. 
Const., art. I, section 8; Pen. Code, sections 682, 888.) An 
information is a written accusation of crime made by a 
district attorney, without action by a grand jury, after a 
magistrate, at a preliminary hearing, has found sufficient 
cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense and 
has ordered him committed. (Cal. Cunst., art. 1, section 8; 
Pen. Code, section 809; see cases cited in 7 Cal. Jur.967, 
note 15.) If there is no reasonable or probable cause for the 
order of the magistrate the defendant may be discharged on 
habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, section 1487; see cases cited in 13 
Cal. Jur. 230.) An indictment is "an accusation in writing, 
presented by the grand jury to a competent court, charging 
a person with a public offense" without the necessity of a 
preliminary examination by a magistrate. (Pen. Code, section 
917; People 'V. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328 [19 Pac. 161J.) 
[1] A grand jury's function is to return an indictment 
against a person only when the evidence presented to it indi-
cates that he has committed a public offense. It is no Star 
Chamber tribunal empowered to return arbitrary indictments 
unsupported by any evidence. On the contrary the necessity 
of basing an indictment upon evidence is implicit in section 
921 of the Penal Code which provides: "The grand jury 
ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them, 
taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in 
their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury." 
19 o. (2d)-1l 
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A grand jury that indicts a person when no evidence has 
been presented to connect him with the commission of the 
crime charged, exceeds the authority conferred upon it by 
the Constitution and laws of the State of California, and 
encroaches upon the right of a person to be free from prose-
cution for crime unless there is some rational ground for 
assuming the possibility that he is guilty. (People v. Resten-
blatt, 1 Abb. Pro (N. Y.) 268; People V. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395 
[66 N. E. 112]; People V. Buffalo Gravel Corp., 195 N. Y. 
Supp. 940; People v. Brickner, 8 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 217 [15 
N. Y. Supp. 528] ; People V. Price, 6 N. Y. Cdm. Rep. 141 
[2 N. Y. Supp. 414]; Gore V. State, 217 Ala. 68 [114 go. 
794J; Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 481 [25 Am. Rep. 643] ; 
People V. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495 [80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St. 
Rep. 621]; see United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853; 
see 59 A. L. R. 567.) Such an indictment is void and confers 
no jurisdiction upon a court to try a person for the offense 
charged. (Ibid. ) It has long been settled in most juris-
dictions that an indictment is invalid if it is unsupported by 
any evidence before the grand jury. (See cases collected in 
59 A. L. R. 567.) If there is some evidence to support the 
indictment, the courts will not inquire into its sufficiency (see 
cases collected in 59 A. L. R. 573), but the lack of any evi-
dence conclusively establishes that the grand jury has ex-
ceeded its authority in returning an indictment. 
[2] At common law an indictment returned by a grand 
jury was unimpeachable" because the grand jury proceedings 
were clothed in secrecy and a court had no access to the evi-
dence upon which the indictment was based. (People v. 
Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 [51 Am. Dec. 77].) There ceased to be 
any reason for the common law rule in this state, however, 
when section 925 of the Penal Code was amended to require 
that a transcript, available to both defendant and prosecutor, 
be kept of the testimony introduced before the grand jury 
in all criminal causes where an indictment is returned. In 
the case of In re Kennedy, 144 Cal. 634 [78 Pac. 34, 103 Am. 
St. Rep. 117, 1 Ann. Cas. 840, 67 L. R. A. 406], a defendant 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, which consti-
tuted the evidence presented to the grand jury, was insuffi-
cient to justify an indictment. The court properly refused 
the writ, holding, in accordance with the general rule, that 
it would not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Jan. 1942.] GREENBERG v. SUPERIOR COURT. 
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Brobeck v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. 289 [92 Pac. 646], in 
holding that a writ of prohibition did not lie to restrain a 
trial court from proceeding upon an indictment where there 
was no evidence presented to the grand jury to support the 
charges, relied solely upon the authority of In re Kennedy 
without noting the difference between the two cases. At the 
time each case was decided, section 925 of the Penal Code 
merely permitted the district attorney at his discretion to 
have testimony before the grand jury reported but did not 
make such reporting mandatory. The cases therefore do not 
control the present situation and the views expressed therein 
inconsistent with this opinion are disapproved. ' 
Petitioner cannot appeal either from the order denying his 
motion to quash· the indictment or from the overruling of 
his demurrer. He could not be required to stand trial and 
to appeal from a possible adverse jUdgment without being 
subjected to unreasonable expense, inconvenience, and delay. 
(Bruner V. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239 [28 Pac. 341] ; Terrill 
V. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Unrep. 398 [60 Pac. 38J; Evans v. 
Willis, 22 Okla. 310 [97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258, 
19 L. R. A. (NS) 1050]; see Farraher v. Superior Court, 
45 Cal. App. 4 [187 Pac. 72].) The only adequate remedy 
he may seek, therefore, is a writ of prohibition (Ibid.). 
Regardless of the fact that the grand jury is a judicial tri-
bunal from whose decisions there is no appeal (In re Ken-
nedy, supra), defendant has the statutory right to restrain 
the· court by prohibition from proceeding in excess of its 
jurisdiction to try an offense based on a void indictment. 
Petitioner is therefore entitled to a peremptory writ of prohi-
bition restraining the respondent court from proceeding with 
the trial. 
Let a writ of prohibition issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
